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The question whether courts should consult the laws of “other states” has produced 
intense controversy. But in some ways, this practice is entirely routine; within the United States, 
state courts regularly consult the decisions of other state courts in deciding on the common law, 
the interpretation of statutory law, and even on the meaning of state constitutions. A formal 
argument in defense of such consultation stems from the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which says 
that under certain conditions, a widespread belief, accepted by a number of independent actors, is 
highly likely to be correct. It follows that if a large majority of states make a certain decision 
based on a certain shared belief, and the states are well motivated, there is good reason to believe 
that the decision is correct. For the Jury Theorem to apply, however, three conditions must be 
met: states must be making judgments based on private information; states must be relevantly 
similar; and states must be making decisions independently, rather than mimicking one another. 
An understanding of these conditions offers qualified support for the domestic practice of 
referring to the laws of other states, while also raising some questions about the Supreme Court’s 
reference to the laws of other nations. It is possible, however, to set out the ingredients of an 
approach that high courts might follow, at least if we make certain assumptions about the 
legitimate sources of interpretation. Existing practice, at the domestic and international levels, 
suggests that many courts are now following an implicit Condorcetian logic. 
 1 
 
The Law of Other States 
 




Consider the following cases: 
1. The Supreme Court of Texas is deciding whether to give a broad reading to the 
“public policy exception” to its general rule that employment is at-will.
1 The court is 
concerned that a broad reading, intruding on the ability of employers to manage the 
workplace, might have serious adverse effects on the economy of Texas. Because of that 
concern, the Court investigates the practices of other states. It notices that most state 
courts have read the public policy exception broadly, and have done so without causing 
noticeable adverse effects on the economy of their states. Influenced by those decisions, 
the Court adopts a broad reading of the public policy exception. 
2. The Supreme Court of Vermont is deciding whether to rule that under its state 
constitution, discrimination on the basis of sex is subject to “strict scrutiny,” ensuring that 
such discrimination will almost always be struck down. The Supreme Court of Vermont 
consults the practices of other states, and discovers that the overwhelming majority of 
state courts interpret their constitutions so as to subject sex discrimination to strict 
scrutiny. It follows the practice of that overwhelming majority. 
  3. The Supreme Court of the United States is deciding to rule whether government 
may execute people under the age of eighteen.
2 Believing that the question is difficult, the 
Court decides to consult the practices of other nations.
3 It happens that few nations 
impose the death penalty on people under the age of eighteen. Influenced by that 
judgment, the Court rules that the United States may not constitutionally do so. 
  The practice of consulting “foreign precedents” has received a great deal of 
attention in connection with recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
4 
                                                 
1 On the public policy exception, see Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third 
Party Effects, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1943 (1996). On the phenomenon of interstate citations in this particular 
domain, see David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State 
Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 L. & Soc. Rev. 337 (1997). 
2 This is of course the issue in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
3 See id. at 1198-1200. 
4 See Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 57 
(2004); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 Yale L.J. 1225 (1999); 2 
 
In those decisions, the Court has referred to comparative law in deciding whether a state 
practice violates the United States Constitution.
5 The references have proved 
exceptionally controversial.
6 But in some ways, it is quite standard to refer to the 
decisions of other jurisdictions, and the debate over the references of the Supreme Court 
should be understood in the context of that standard practice. Within the United States, 
for example, state courts frequently refer to the judgments of other state courts in ruling 
on questions of private and public law, and indeed in ruling on the meaning of state 
constitutions.







13 and North Carolina,
14 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 239 (2003); Ernest A. 
Young, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term--Comment: Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 Harv. 
L. Rev. 148 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term--Comment: Constitutional 
Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 109 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, The 
Supreme Court, 2004 Term--Comment: Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 129 
(2005); Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the “Opinions of Mankind”: International Law in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 8 Green Bag 2d 261 (2005); Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. 
Constitution, Pol’y Rev., June-July 2005, at 33; Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The 
Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death 
Penalty Decision, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (2005); Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections, 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 353 (2004); Rex Glensy, Which Countries 
Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 Va. J. Int’l L. 357 
(2005). A recent article by Mark Tushnet provides a comprehensive and concise overview of the debate, 
see Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More?: Unpacking the Controversy over 
Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, unpub. m.s., 2005. A bill in the House would forbid courts to 
rely on foreign law, see Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568, 108
th Cong. 
(2004). 
5 In recent years, the Court has referred to foreign precedents on several occasions. See Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 568-74 (2003); Roper, supra; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992-93 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 
944, 944-45 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 734 (1997); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
6 See note supra. 
7 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 498-99 (Ky. 1992) (invaliding state sodomy 
statute after citing for support other state court constitutional decisions from New York, Pennsylvania, 
Michigan, and Texas); see Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and 
Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 15, 19-20 (2004). 
8 A. Michael Beaid, Citations to Authority by the Arkansas Appellate Courts, 1950-2000, 25 U. Ark. Little 
Rock L. Rev. 301 (2003) (finding 1,508 out-of-state citations by Arkansas Supreme Court, out of 15,128 
total citations). 
9 William Nanz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals: A Millennium Update, 49 Buff. 
L. Rev. 1273 (2001) (finding out-of-state citations accounting for 27.7% of case citations in 1999 and 
22.3% in 2000). 
10 Joseph Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeal, 7 Kansas J. 
L. & Pub. Pol’y 120 (1998) (finding sister state citations at level of 13.9% in 1995).  3 
 
among others.
15 In constitutional cases, state courts have been found to cite out-of-state 
courts in no less than 34.8% of their decisions, with substantially higher percentages in 
Massachusetts, Arizona, and Vermont.
16 It is not taken to be illegitimate, or even 
controversial, for one state to consult the practices of others in deciding on the meaning 
of the state’s founding document.
17 On the contrary, “comparative law” is a routine and 
uncontroversial feature of the jurisprudence of state courts.
18  
  Many national courts regularly consult “foreign precedents” in deciding on the 
meaning of their own constitutions.
19 The Supreme Court of Ireland cites foreign law 
with great frequency.
20 Between 1994 and 1998, South Africa Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Court decisions made no fewer than 1,258 references to American, 
Canadian, British, German, European, and Indian courts.
21 The Supreme Court of Israel 
makes heavy use of foreign law in multiple domains.
22 At least in some cases, German 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 See James Leonard, An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions, 86 Law. Libr. J. 
129, 137-38 (1994) (finding 8.9% of citations to sister states in 1990). 
12 Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 Mont. L. Rev. 453, 462 (1996) 
(finding 7% of citations were to sister states in 1994, significantly lower than in 1954-1955 and 1914-1915) 
13 See John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of 
the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381 (1977 (finding 13% out-of-
state citations in 1950, 12% in 1960, and 6.3% in 1970) 
14 See Robert Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 39 (1979) (finding sister states cited 9% of the time). 
15 See Lawrence Friedman et al., State Supreme Court: A Century of Style and Citations, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 
773 (1981); David Blumberg, Influence of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on State High Court 
Decisionmaking 1982-1977: A Study in Horizontal Federalism, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 1583 (1998). 
16 See James Cauthern, Horizontal Federalism in the New Judicial Federalism: A Preliminary Look at 
Citations, 66 Alb. L. Rev. 783 (2003). See also Patrick Baude, Interstate Dialogue in State Constitutional 
Law, 28 Rutgers L.J. 835, 838 (1997). An interesting study can be found in Douglas A. Hedin, The 
Quicksands of Originalism: Interpreting Minnesota’s Constitutional Past, 30 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 241 
(2003) (discussing citations of other state courts, by Minnesota Supreme Court, in interpreting provisions 
of Minnesota Constitution derived from out-of-state constitutions, and showing diminution of out-of-state 
citations over time). 
17 See id.; Gregory A. Caldeira, Legal Precedent: Structure of Communication Between State Supreme 
Courts, 10 Soc. Networks 29 (1988). 
18 For a reputational ranking, based on citations, see Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State 
Supreme Courts, 5 Pol. Behav. 83, 95-101 (1983). 
19 See, e.g., S. v. Mamabolo, 2001 (1) SACR 686 (CC) (S.Afr.). A great deal of relevant information can be 
found in The Use of Comparative Law by Courts (Ulrich Drobnig and Sjef van Erp eds. 1997). 
20 See Bruce Carolan, The Search for Coherence in the Use of Foreign Court Judgments by the Supreme 
Court of Ireland, 12 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 123 (2004). 
21 See Basil Markesinis and Jorg Fedke, The Judge as Comparativist, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 11, 57-58 n. 158 
(2005); in the same vein, see Hoyt Webb, The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation 
and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 205 (1998). 
22 See Renee Sanilevici, The Use of Comparative Law by Israeli Courts, in the Use of Comparative Law by 
Courts, supra note, at 197-221. For several examples from the domain of rights, see Israel Laws Reports 
1992-1994 (Jonathan Davidson ed. 2002). 4 
 
courts consult foreign courts as well,
23 and Swiss and Austrian practice makes a regular 
appearance.
24 Canadian courts hardly restrict themselves to Canadian precedents,
25 and 
Australian courts reach far and wide.
26 Use of foreign law also occurs, if tacitly, in Italy 
and France.
27 In Britain the practice is common, and it appears to be growing over time.
28 
Consultation of foreign law seems to be the rule, not the exception.  
  Our goal here is to set out a framework for assessing the question whether courts 
should consult the practices of other states, either domestically or nationally. Our starting 
point is admittedly unusual: the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
29 We suggest that the Jury 
Theorem provides the simplest argument for following the practices of other states: it 
suggests that if the majority of states believe that X is true, there is reason to believe that 
X is in fact true. In our view, the Jury Theorem also provides the foundation for assessing 
the problems and limits of following the practices of other states.  
  In supplying a governing framework, we attempt to give structure to a debate that 
so far has consisted mainly of ad hoc (though often reasonable and illuminating) 
arguments for or against following the practices of other states. Our hope is that this 
framework might have broad applicability to many situations in which legal authorities 
are deciding whether to consult the decisions of other legal actors. Suppose, for example, 
that it is ultimately agreed that in interpreting the American Constitution, the United 
States Supreme Court should not consult the practices of other nations. It may remain 
possible that other high courts, interpreting their own constitutions, should consult such 
                                                 
23 Markesinis and Fedke, supra note, at 35-45. 
24 Ulrich Drobnig, The Use of Foreign Law by German Courts, in The Use of Comparative Law by Courts 
127, 134-35 (Ulrich Drognig and Sjef van Erp eds. 1999). 
25 See S. Ian Bushnell, The Use of American Cases, 35 U. New Brunswick L.J. 157 (1986); J.M. 
MacIntyre, The Use of American Cases in Canadian Courts, 2 U. British Columbia L. Rev. 478 (1966); H. 
Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 McGill L.J. 261 (1987); Peter McCormick, Judicial Authority and 
the Provincial Courts of Appeal: A Statistical Investigation of Citation Practices, 22 Man. L.J. 286 (1993).  
26 See Russell Smyth, What Do Intermediate Appellate Courts Cite? A Quantitative Study of the Citation 
Practice of Australian State Supreme Court, 21 Adelaide L. Rev. 51 (1999). 
27 See Markesinis and Fedke, supra note, at 26-31 (noting that Italian and French courts do not cite foreign 
sources but extrinsic evidence suggests they are influenced by them). 
28 Id. at 31-35. 
29 See Marquis de Condorcet, Selected Writings (Keith Michael Baker, ed., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 
1976). Importantly, the Theorem does not apply only to binary decisions; it can be extended to 
decisionmaking when there are multiple issues (rather than a single yes/no question) and the outcome is 
chosen by a plurality. See Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. Pol. Philosophy 277 (2001). For helpful overviews, see Dennis C. Mueller, 
Public Choice III 129 (2003); Robert E. Goodin, Reflective Democracy 95-96 (2005). 5 
 
practices. The analysis here might justify and inform such consultation. The same 
analysis might apply not only to state courts operating domestically, but also to 
judgments by legislatures, of states or of nations, that are deciding whether to follow the 
majority view of apparently relevant others.
30 In structuring a program to protect 
endangered species, the legislature of Montana may or may not want to follow the 
general practices of other state legislatures; in deciding on national energy policy, or in 
seeking to control global warming, Congress may or may not want to adopt the 
approaches of other nations. For such judgments, the Condorcet Jury Theorem provides a 
helpful place to start. 
  Four clarifications before we begin. First, we assume initially that judges can 
interpret foreign materials both easily and adequately. It is important to see how the 
analysis should proceed if judges could undertake it properly; but of course there is no 
assurance that they can. In Part V we will discuss the extent to which more realistic 
assumptions about judicial capacities would complicate our basic claims, and perhaps 
justify a departure from them in the interest of easy administration. Second, we are 
concerned with the use of foreign decisions as relevant information for resolving 
disputes, not with the use of foreign decisions as “precedent”; indeed, we do not believe 
that anyone seeks to use those decisions in that way.
31 Third, we assume that the Supreme 
Court has been candid about its reasons for using foreign sources, and so the controversy 
is over doctrine and not judicial rhetoric.
32 The fact that state courts regularly use 
                                                 
30 Note in this regard that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, a critique of judicial reliance on foreign 
decisions, finds it “entirely appropriate for our elected representatives in the Congress or the State 
legislatures to consider how lawmakers in other countries have approached problems when our 
representatives write the laws of the United States.” Alberto Gonzales, Foreign Law and Constitutional 
Interpretation 3 (Nov. 9. 2005), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/Gonzales-speech-
intro.html. 
31 There are tricky jurisprudential questions here, to be sure. Ernest Young argues that a court treats foreign 
decisions as authoritative if they are “deferring to numbers, not reasons,” Young, supra, at 155, relying on 
Joseph Raz’s argument that an institution has authority when others defer to its judgments not because of 
its reasons but because of its epistemic advantages. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 35 (1986). 
Perhaps this is so, but it seems odd to say that the body of foreign legislation and decisions has “authority,” 
just as it is odd to say that a public opinion poll has authority. But the debate should not be a semantic one. 
What is really at stake is not a semantic or even jurisprudential question, but whether judicial decisions will 
be improved if judges consult foreign materials for additional information and use that information to make 
their decisions. We do not think it matters if this practice is labeled as giving “authority” to foreign courts 
or not. 
32 For the latter view, see Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-- Foreword: A Political 
Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 88-89 (2005). For criticism of this view, see Tushnet, When Is Knowing, 
supra. 6 
 
“foreign” sources in the same way that the Supreme Court has done provides some 
assurance on this count. 
  Finally, we hope that our analysis will prove useful to people with diverse views 
about the proper interpretation of the Constitution. It is tempting and to some extent 
correct to think that originalism,
33 by itself, excludes reference to foreign precedents; if 
the Constitution means what it originally meant, the contemporary practices of foreign 
nations are usually immaterial.
34 And indeed, our analysis will help show why, exactly, 
those with different approaches to constitutional interpretation reach different 
conclusions about the relevance of foreign law. But at least in some cases, our 
conclusions should be attractive to originalists as well as to those who reject originalism 
or prefer some middle way. Whenever the court has to make a factual or moral inquiry 
that is required by original understanding, then the framework provided by the Jury 
Theorem provides a useful place to start.
35 Of course some theories of constitutional 
interpretation will be relatively less willing to ask about the factual and moral questions 
on which comparative law might bear, and we shall pay considerable attention to 
variations on that count. 
  Our emphasis is normative, but the central argument has positive as well as 
normative implications. Indeed, we are willing to hypothesize that an implicit 
understanding of the Condorcetian argument helps explain a wide range of existing 
practices, including the fact that state courts consult the legal materials of other state 
courts more than national courts consult the legal materials of foreign courts, and the fact 
that national courts in young nations consult the legal materials of foreign courts more 
frequently than do national courts in older nations. In Part VI, we derive some specific 
testable hypotheses from the Condorcet approach, provide tentative support for those 
                                                 
33 For an outline, see Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997). 
34 See Gonzales, supra. Consider in particular Attorney General Gonzales’ suggestion that it is appropriate 
to consult English sources to carry “out the original political will reflected in the Constitution,” id. at 5, and 
the contrasting claim that the “present trend” reflects an illegitimate effort “to consider evolving, 
contemporary legal judgments and policy preferences of other nations.” Id.  
35 Tushnet provides one example: if the proper original interpretation of the eighth amendment requires 
courts to determine evolving norms, this is a factual inquiry that would benefit from consultation of foreign 
decisions, at least if evolving norms are not merely those internal to the United States. See Tushnet, When 
Is Knowing, supra, m.s. at 7. But the value of comparative law for originalists is broader than this. To the 
extent that any original understanding requires courts to measure the extent to which a law burdens some 
behavior (speech, religious practice, commerce, etc.), the experience of foreign states with similar rules 
should be relevant. 7 
 
hypotheses, and suggest other ways that they could be evaluated empirically. 
 
2.The Jury Theorem and Following Other States 
 
  To see how the Jury Theorem works, suppose that people are answering the same 
question with two possible answers, one false and one true. Assume too that the 
probability that each voter will answer correctly exceeds 50%, and that these probabilities 
are independent. The Jury Theorem says that the probability of a correct answer, by a 
majority of the group, increases toward 100% as the size of the group increases.
36 The 
key point is that groups will do better than individuals, and large groups better than small 
ones, so long as two conditions are met: majority rule is used and each person is more 
likely than not to be correct. 
  The theorem is based on some fairly simple arithmetic. Suppose, for example, that 
there is a three-person group in which each member has a 67% probability of being right. 
The probability that a majority vote will produce the correct answer is 74%. As the size 
of the group increases, this probability increases too. It should be clear that as the 
likelihood of a correct answer by individual members increases, the likelihood of a 
correct answer by the group increases as well, at least if majority rule is used. If group 
members are 80% likely to be right, and if the group contains ten or more people, the 
probability of correct answer by the majority is overwhelmingly high – very close to 
100%.
37 In countless domains, imperfectly informed individuals and institutions adopt a 
heuristic in favor of following the majority of relevant others (the “do-what-the-majority-
do” heuristic
38); and this heuristic reflects the logic of the Jury Theorem. 
 
The basic argument 
                                                 
36 See note supra. 
37 For a lucid discussion of the Jury Theorem, and its application to legal problems, see Paul H. Edelman, 
On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. Legal Stud. 327 (2002). 
38 See Gerd Gigerenzer, Moral Intuition = Fast and Frugal Heuristics? (forthcoming 2006); see also the 
discussion of imitation as a fast and frugal heuristic in K. Laland, Imitation, Social Learning, and 
Preparedness As Mechanisms of Bounded Rationality, in Bounded Rationality, in Bounded Rationality: 
The Adaptive Toolbox 233 (Gerd Gigerenzer and Richard Selten eds. 2002); and Joseph Henrich et al., 
What Is the Role of Culture in id. at 343, 344 (“Cultural transmission capacities allow individuals to 
shortcut the costs of search, experimentation, and data processing algorithms, and instead benefit from the 
cumulative experience stored in the minds (and observed in the behavior) of others.”). 8 
 
  It should be easy to see how the Jury Theorem might be invoked to support use of 
the law of other states. Suppose that the Supreme Court of Texas is deciding whether to 
adopt rule A or instead rule B. Suppose too that the vast majority of states have adopted 
rule A. If we assume that each state is more likely than not to make the right decision, in 
the sense of being well motivated and more likely than not correct in its beliefs, then 
there is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court of Texas should, in fact, adopt rule 
A. When states are deciding on appropriate policies, it is at least reasonable to assume 
that each is, or most are, likely to do better than random, which is an adequate basis for 
analyzing the question in terms of the Jury Theorem. At least at first glance, the point 
applies to constitutional law no less than to statutory and common law.
39 If a state court is 
deciding on the meaning of its own Due Process Clause, it might well consult the 
decisions of other state courts, simply because the majority view, under the stated 
assumptions, has a high probability of being correct. 
  This argument is easiest to accept if we can assume uncontroversially that there is 
a right answer to the question whether a state should prefer rule A or rule B. Suppose that 
the choice between the two turns on a disputed question of fact. For example, will rule A 
cause significant disemployment effects on the state’s economy? Will rule B increase 
prices, or increase the incidence of racial discrimination? If the court is focusing on a 
factual question, and if a majority of states has answered that question a certain way, the 
court has some reason to believe that the majority view is correct. We might therefore 
arrive at a simple conclusion: Where the choice of legal rule turns on an answer to a 
disputed factual question, the practice of a substantial majority of states should be 
followed, at least as a presumption. The conventional practice in state courts – of 
consulting and often following the clear majority view – is easily understood and 
defended in these terms. 
  Suppose, however, that the question is not simply or largely one of fact. Perhaps it 
is largely a moral question; perhaps the state wants to know whether it is morally 
acceptable to ban same-sex relationships, to refuse to protect an asserted right to housing 
                                                 
39 We explore below why the first glance might be misleading. In brief, if the meaning of a constitutional 
provision is a matter of uncovering the original understanding, the views of other states may not be terribly 
informative. Interestingly, however, states nonetheless consult other states in interpreting their own 
constitutions. See notes supra. 9 
 
or health care, or to execute juveniles. (Let us simply stipulate that the question of moral 
acceptability is relevant to the legal judgment; we will return to that stipulation below.) If 
we are skeptics about morality, and believe that moral questions do not have right 
answers, then it is pointless to care what other states do; it is also difficult to see how a 
state court could go about answering the relevant question. But if we are not skeptics, and 
if we believe that moral questions do have right answers, then it makes sense to consult 
the majority’s view. Most ambitiously, we might believe that moral questions simply 
have right answers as such, and hence the view of most states is probative of what is 
right. Less ambitiously, we might believe that the right answer to a moral question 
sometimes turns on the right answer to factual questions, and the view of most states is 
probative on that count as well.  
  It is imaginable, for example, that the right answer to a question about same-sex 
relationships depends, in part, on whether children will be harmed by permitting such 
relationships. Or suppose that the legitimacy of capital punishment for juveniles depends, 
in part, on whether such punishment has a significant deterrent effect on juveniles. The 
practices of most states might be taken to provide some evidence on these questions. As a 
single practice obtains widespread support, the likelihood that it is right might appear to 
be very high. 
 
An initial puzzle and underlying assumptions 
  This, then, is the core of a reasonable argument for consulting the law of other 
states. But when and how the Jury Theorem can be applied to that practice of consultation 
depends on whether the assumptions underlying the Theorem apply. An initial puzzle is 
what we will call the who votes? problem. Suppose that a court seeks to determine 
whether some law, X, has some desirable effect, Y. The court observes that a majority of 
other states have enacted law X, but it also discovers that, in the aggregate, more 
legislators oppose X than support it – in the states with X, a bare majority of legislators 
voted in favor of the law, while in states without X, nearly all legislators voted against the 
law. Should the court count the states with law X or the legislators who voted for X? Or 
suppose that polls show that the majority of populations in all states oppose X while the 
majority of legislators voted for X. Should the court count the legislators or the people? 10 
 
Similarly, should courts that look at outcomes in other courts count the number of judge-
votes or the number of court-votes? These complications can be multiplied. 
  In principle, the who votes? question is easily answered. From the Condorcetian 
perspective, the court should focus on the people who have the best relevant information. 
Suppose that foreign legislators focus on the deterrent effect of the juvenile death penalty, 
foreign populations focus on its moral permissibility, and foreign courts focus on its 
consistency with local law. If so, then an American court that cares only about the 
deterrence issue should count the legislators rather than the other agents. In practice, it 
may be difficult for courts to make such fine distinctions. The motives of legislators, the 
thinking of populations, and the workings of government are sufficiently opaque to 
foreigners that it is probably appropriate to rely only on the authoritative outcomes – duly 
enacted legislation, judicial opinions – and ignore the rest.  
    For the Condocertian argument to work, moreover, each state, or most states, must 
be more likely than not to make the right choice. The arithmetic has some complexity 
here,
40 but the intuition is simple: If each state is more likely to be wrong than right, then 
the likelihood of an incorrect answer, from a majority of states, approaches 100% as the 
size of the group expands. If Massachusetts has reason to believe that states are likely to 
err on the question of same-sex marriage (perhaps for reasons of what Condorcet himself 
called “prejudice”
41), then it might choose to ignore the majority view. If the United 
States believes that most nations are likely to blunder on a question of free speech, or 
antitrust law, then the Jury Theorem argues in favor or ignoring their practice – or 
perhaps even doing the opposite of what they do. We shall refer to this point at various 
stages below. For the moment we focus on three less obvious assumptions, each of which 
may or may not hold in relevant contexts. 
     First, a foreign state’s law must reflect a judgment based on that state’s private 
information about how some question is best answered. Otherwise, the law is not 
analogous to a vote that aggregates information. We will also address the possibility that 
the judgment reflects the hidden preferences of the voters rather than hidden facts that 
they know. In the former case, there is a case for relying on foreign law, but it is weaker 
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than in the latter case.
42 
  Second, a foreign state’s law must address a problem that is similar to the problem 
before the domestic court. This similarity condition refers not only to the facts (does the 
foreign state have a similar crime problem?) but also to the legal principles, institutions, 
and values of the foreign state. Otherwise, the foreign law is not analogous to a vote on 
the same issue. It is possible, of course, that pertinent difference between the foreign and 
domestic arenas make the foreign judgment irrelevant to the issue at hand. Perhaps other 
states do not allow same-sex marriage, but perhaps they are relevantly different from 
Massachusetts, whose Supreme Judicial Court might therefore feel free to ignore the 
consensus judgment.
43 It is here, we shall suggest, that different views about 
constitutional interpretation, and its proper sources, can lead to different judgments about 
the relevance of foreign law. The Constitutional Court of Germany, for example, might 
believe that a moral judgment bears on the meaning of a constitutional guarantee, 
whereas another high court might reject that belief. 
  Third, and perhaps most interestingly, the law of the foreign state must reflect an 
independent judgment; it must not be a matter of merely following other states. If the 
foreign law exists because the foreign state mimicked some other state, then the law 
would not count as an independent vote, as required by the Jury Theorem. When this 
condition is violated, we will say that foreign law reflects a cascade effect.
44 The problem 
with a cascade effect is that a state, apparently contributing to information about what 
must be done, is actually following the relevant judgments of others. To the extent that 
states and nations are participating in cascades, they are undermining a key assumption 
on which consultation of foreign law depends. The possibility of cascade effects weakens 
the argument, not only for following other courts, but more generally for following the 
practices of other states and nations, including legislatures and administrative agencies. 
  For a preliminary sense of the nature of these conditions, consider the question in 
Roper itself, which was whether the juvenile death penalty is “cruel and unusual.”
45 The 
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information aggregation model. See Edelman, supra. 
43 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (Mass. 2003). 
44 See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and 
Informational Cascades, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 151 (1998). 
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issue is whether we should consider the abolition (or the lack of) the juvenile death 
penalty in most other countries as relevant information for the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Suppose, first, that the issue that the Court cares about is whether the 
juvenile death penalty deters juvenile crime. (We do not claim that this issue was crucial 
to the Court’s decision, though the Court mentioned the point.
46) Can the Court plausibly 
conclude that nearly all other nations have expressed an independent judgment that the 
juvenile death penalty does not deter crime -- and that therefore the probability that the 
juvenile death penalty deters crime is very low, perhaps close to zero? 
  The first condition says that the Court should ignore states that (say) abolished the 
juvenile death penalty for explicitly moral, religious, or ideological reasons independent 
of any juvenile crime problem. The reason is that the abolition of the penalty did not 
reflect a judgment about the relevant issue here, whether the juvenile death penalty 
deters. The second condition says that the Court should ignore states that do not have a 
juvenile crime problem – perhaps because families or clans have much more control over 
children than families do in the United States. The third condition says that the Court 
should ignore states that abolished the juvenile death penalty merely because other states 
abolished the juvenile death penalty. The abolition by the later states does not provide 
additional information about whether the juvenile death penalty deters. 
  Note that whether and how these conditions apply depends heavily on how the 
question is framed. Suppose that the Court does not care whether the juvenile death 
penalty deters but sees itself as determining whether the juvenile death penalty is 
immoral or in some other way a violation of evolving social norms. The question now is 
not whether the juvenile death penalty deters (though this may remain a relevant 
consideration) but whether other states’ laws provide information about the evolving 
norms with respect to the morality of the juvenile death penalty. The first condition 
requires that the foreign states have in fact made a moral judgment (which may be hard to 
ascertain) and also whether the foreign state has private information about the morality of 
the juvenile death penalty (which may or may not seem unlikely). The second condition 
requires that the foreign state regard the juvenile death penalty as a moral issue, and also 
that moral norms in the foreign state be similar to those in the United States. The third 
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condition requires that the foreign state, as before, not merely mimic the laws of other 
states. 
  We now turn to a more detailed discussion of these points. 
 
3. The Judgment Condition 
 
The Jury Theorem requires that the voter have a probability estimate and then 
vote sincerely on the basis of it. There are two points here. First, the voter must have 
private information. Second, the voter must sincerely reveal this information. Let us 
consider these points with more care, and see how they apply to states. 
The first point is that the voter (the foreign state, here) has private information. In 
our running example, it must be the case that, say, Germany abolished the juvenile death 
penalty because the government had information, not available to other countries (or, in 
our example, the U.S.), about the juvenile death penalty. The type of information depends 
on context. As our juvenile death penalty example showed, the Supreme Court might 
want to look at German law for relevant facts (whether Germany believes that the 
juvenile death penalty deters), including “moral facts” (whether Germans believe that the 
juvenile death penalty is immoral). 
One should not take the requirement of private information too literally. The 
deterrent effect of the juvenile death penalty in Germany is in some sense public, given 
that the German legislature must base its decision on an assessment of facts that must be 
widely available within Germany. The point is rather that an American court will often be 
able to determine these facts more cheaply and reliably by consulting German law than 
by doing its own research about the facts on which German law is based. When this is not 
the case, of course, then the argument for consulting foreign law is much weaker. If the 
United States court has direct and unmediated access to the facts, it should consult the 
facts, rather than another nation’s attitude about the facts. The same point holds in the 
domestic context. If a New York court seeks to know whether a certain policy has a 
certain effect, it might investigate that issue directly, rather than asking what most states 
believe the effects to be. But a New York court might not be in a good position to 14 
 
investigate the issue, rather than the belief. We will return to this question – whether it is 
better to consult foreign law or the facts or attitudes that it reflects – in a later section. 
A further point is that a foreign law will often be consistent with multiple factual 
conditions, and this weakens its value as a “vote.” The absence of the juvenile death 
penalty may be the result of “pure” moral convictions, not a local assessment about its 
lack of deterrent effect. If so, an American court interested in learning about the deterrent 
effect of the juvenile death penalty will learn nothing from German law -- and, indeed, 
may not even know whether German law reflects moral considerations or information 
about deterrence. Or suppose that Germans oppose the juvenile death penalty not because 
of moral convictions (that is, private information about what we are treating as moral 
facts) and not because of private information about its deterrent effect, but simply 
because they find the juvenile death penalty distasteful. The lack of the death penalty, 
then, just tells us that Germans find it distasteful. If most other countries also lack the 
death penalty, the Jury Theorem might just tell us that most people find the death penalty 
distasteful. This is not likely to be relevant to American adjudication. 
This latter problem leads to our second inquiry, which is whether the state is 
“sincere.” In the standard application of the Jury Theorem, sincerity means that the 
voter’s vote is based on her private information, and that she does not vote 
“strategically,” in order to obtain some other end. As an example, consider the 
application of the Jury Theorem to an ordinary jury. A juror votes sincerely if her vote 
reflects her assessment about the defendant’s guilt. A juror votes insincerely if her vote 
reflects some other purpose – for example, to ensure that deliberations end quickly, or to 
impress other jurors, or to show other jurors that she has an independent mind. 
In our setting, the sincerity requirement can be understood as the requirement that 
the state’s political system produces laws (or its legal system produces judicial decisions) 
that accurately reflect the “private” facts or values.
47 Here, the question is whether the 
foreign government enacted the law in question (or failed to repeal it) because of the 
relevant private information or because of political dynamics of no concern to the 
American court. Suppose that Germany lacks the juvenile death penalty because of the 
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disproportionate influence of an interest group, one that does not much care about the 
relevant facts or moral principles. The influence of the interest group muddies the 
informational value of the vote. It may be that the interest group would not be able to 
effect the repeal if Germans believed strongly that the juvenile death penalty is justified 
on moral or deterrence grounds; but since the American judge cannot determine the 
extent of the interest group’s influence, it cannot measure the quality of the information 
on the basis of which Germans resist its pressure or not. 
States are not people and some may find it odd to label a state law as “sincere” or 
not. What is important is not sincerity in the psychological sense but whether the laws of 
other states, including judicial decisions, reflect a political or legal process that 
incorporates information that is private to the state – in the sense that government 
officials have that information as a result of their own research, their own local 
knowledge, or their ability to aggregate the information, judgments, and values of the 
mass of citizens. Political and legal systems may be defective in various ways. The laws 
might reflect the choices of a tiny ruling elite; so might the judicial opinions. In these 
cases, it would be wise for the American court to ignore or discount the law of the other 
state. 
 
4. The Similarity Condition 
 
The similarity condition is both straightforward and important, but easily 
misunderstood. It says that the foreign law provides relevant information – it is a “vote” 
on the relevant question – only if the foreign country is sufficiently similar in the right 
way to the United States. All countries are different from all other countries, and the laws 
of countries that are similar in many ways may nonetheless diverge considerably because 
the two countries are dissimilar in some crucial way. The relevant question is not whether 
the U.S. and some other country like Germany are similar in some general or abstract 
sense; the question is whether the German law or judicial opinion that might be relevant 
information for an American court addressing a factual, moral, or institutional problem 
that is similar in Germany and the United States. 16 
 
Indeed, in many cases dissimilarity will be affirmatively desirable, for purposes of 
using the Jury Theorem, as long as the dimensions along which other countries differ 
from the U.S. are not correlated. Suppose, for example, that all states (except the United 
States) ban the juvenile death penalty. If all the other states were identical, we might be 
worried that the ban reflected some invisible institutional aspect of these other countries 
rather than a robust moral conviction. Suppose, now, that the countries all have different 
moral and legal traditions, and that some countries have serious juvenile crime and others 
not, and so forth. The fact that such different nations all ban the juvenile death penalty 
might indicate that the death penalty violates universal moral norms, or that the juvenile 
death penalty is ineffective because of universal characteristics of the problem (for 
example, that juveniles discount the future more than adults do, and thus are not 
deterrable). However, we will put aside this consideration and focus on how courts can 
determine whether the similarity condition is met. 
 
Factual differences 
Suppose that a factual question is at issue: Will a certain practice create 
disemployment effects? Perhaps a practice will have such effects in one state, with its 
distinctive mix of employers, even though it does not have such effects in other states, 
with their very different mix of employers. We started with the example of Texas trying 
to determine whether a public policy exception to employment at will would have an 
adverse effect on the employment market and looking at the law of other American states 
in order to find an answer. Is there any reason why Texas should not also look at the law 
in France or the United Kingdom? 
One reason not to do this is that France is more different from Texas than, say, 
Vermont is. But many of the differences, including many of the most dramatic 
differences, are immaterial. For example, the fact that French is spoken in France, and 
English is spoken in Texas and Vermont, is not relevant. The fact that France has more 
generous employment benefits, so that high unemployment may be more willingly 
tolerated in France than in Texas or Vermont, is relevant. So in this case, it might be 
unwise for Texas to place weight on French law. 17 
 
Consider again the juvenile death penalty. The absence of such a law in a nation 
like Switzerland, where there is very little violent crime among juveniles, may provide 
little information; perhaps Switzerland has never had to confront the question of whether 
to have a juvenile death penalty because no one thinks there is a juvenile crime problem. 
But suppose that Russia has a serious problem of violent juvenile crime, a death penalty 
for adults, but no juvenile death penalty. Even though Russia is a very different country, 
the absence of the juvenile death penalty there might tell an American court that the 
Russians have concluded that such a law would not have a significant deterrent effect. 
Now the Russian experience may be further distinguishable – perhaps juveniles 
there do not have access to guns to the same degree as in the United States – but these 
differences can also be taken account. The differences between Russia and Texas, on the 






The relevance of the Jury Theorem when moral judgments are at issue is more 
complex, and depends on a number of conditions. First, one must reject any strong form 
of cultural relativism, according to which the appropriate moral rules are culture-
dependent, so that the moral requirements that are suitable for one culture need not be 
suitable for another culture. If a court subscribes to this strong form of cultural relativism, 
then it should not consult foreign law for information about what morality requires. In 
Jury Theorem terms, a foreign country’s rejection of some practice on moral grounds 
provides no information about whether this practice is morally acceptable in the United 
States. We believe that strong forms of cultural relativism are difficult to sustain,
49 and 
hence this objection may be safely ignored; but for those who are committed to cultural 
relativism, consultation of comparative law will make little sense.  
It is possible that some opposition to such consultation depends on a form of 
cultural relativism or, perhaps more interestingly, a form of cultural relativism with 
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respect to law in general or constitutional law in particular. It is here that different 
approaches to constitutional interpretation might lead to different judgments about 
comparative law; and hence opposition to use of foreign law
50 might be brought in close 
contact with the Condorcet Jury Theorem. On one understanding of originalism, for 
example, the practices of other nations are generally irrelevant, because the interpretive 
goal is to recover the original understanding of the relevant provision, and on the original 
understanding, the constitutional issue must be resolved without reference to those 
practices.
51 On this view, constitutional law is culturally relative even if morality is not; 
perhaps the meaning of the founding document does not depend on what other nations 
do. When the United States Supreme Court is deciding on the meaning of the equal 
protection clause, perhaps it is not making anything like a moral inquiry into the 
requirements of equality, and perhaps the information that comes from the practices of 
other nations is almost never relevant.
52 
If this position is accepted, of course, a degree of cultural relativism is appropriate 
in the domain of constitutional law. On this view, American states properly consult the 
practices of other states, certainly in making common law decisions and perhaps more 
generally;
53 but the United States Supreme Court ought rarely, if ever, to consult the 
practices of other nations. When some nations consult comparative law, it is because their 
own interpretive practices justify the consultation; there is no reason to think that every 
nation must follow the same such practices.
54 Under the constitutional approach in South 
Africa, for example, the constitutionality of certain laws legitimately turns, in part, on the 
views of other nations;
55 and here the Condorcet Jury Theorem helps to explain why. The 
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If the meaning of the Constitution of Montana turns on the original understanding in Montana, or is 
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United States might be different; whether it is depends on a judgment about the right 
theory of constitutional interpretation.
56 
Second, and related, one must probably reject any moral theory that holds that the 
legally relevant moral judgments are best understood as a product of a nation’s distinctive 
traditions and history – at least if the theory does not always acknowledge that the lessons 
of a particular history can be universal. If Germany rejects the death penalty simply 
because of its Nazi past, for example, and if that rejection does not offer a general moral 
lesson, this rejection has little informational value for the United States. Perhaps 
Germany’s judgment is a product of the nationally specific associations of the death 
penalty, in a way that has no implications for other nations. Third, one must, of course, 
reject any skeptical moral theory that holds that morality is just a matter of personal 
preferences, or that moral rules are sufficiently obvious that research does not shed light 
on them – one just consults one’s own conscience. 
 
Moral practices and moral contenders 
Mainstream philosophical theories reject strong forms of skepticism and 
relativism,
57 and thus provide a reasonable foundation for courts to consult foreign 
materials in order to determine moral rules, where legal decisions are legitimately based 
in whole or in part on moral judgments. Here we shall focus on those judgments, 
assuming for purposes of analysis that they bear on the proper resolution of a legal 
controversy.  
It is possible that legal actors should reason from the moral judgments of other 
nations without asking anything about the foundations of those judgments. Consider, for 
example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
58 The emergence of the Universal 
Declaration involved something closely akin to what we are describing here: an effort to 
root legal norms in an understanding of the independent judgments of relevant nations.
59 
Indeed the process had a powerful if implicit Condorcetian feature, involving as it did an 
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inquiry into the practices of all or most. The basic enterprise operated by surveying the 
behavior of most nations, and by building a “universal declaration” on the basis of shared 
practices. A philosophers’ group, involved in the project, “began its work by sending a 
questionnaire to statesmen and scholars around the world.”
60 At a key stage, those 
involved in drafting the declaration produced “a list of forty-eight items that represented 
... the common core of” a wide range of documents and proposals, including judgments 
from “Arabic, British, Canadian, Chinese, French, pre-Nazi German, Italian, Latin 
American, Polish, Soviet Russian and Spanish” nations and cultures.
61 Jacques Maritain, 
a philosopher closely involved in the Universal Declaration, famously said, “Yes, we 
agree about the rights, but on condition no one asks us why.”
62 Hence a judgment in favor 
of a set of rights can emerge across disagreement or uncertainty about the foundations of 
those rights. Law rarely requires deep engagement with high-level moral disputes; legal 
controversies can thereby be resolved with less ambitious judgments, even those with a 
moral component.
63 
Suppose, for example, that the Supreme Court of Idaho is deciding whether the 
free speech provision of its Constitution protects commercial advertising. Idaho might 
notice that the overwhelming majority of states have concluded that their state 
constitutions do, in fact, protect commercial advertising. If so, the Supreme Court of 
Idaho might rule in favor of commercial advertising, without making any particularly 
ambitious claims about the foundations of constitutional law or even of the free speech 
principle. The examples could easily be multiplied. 
It is also possible, however, to see how the Jury Theorem might be relevant for 
the two main high-level moral contenders: utilitarian or welfarist approaches
64 on the one 
hand and deontological approaches on the other. As before, we are assuming that one or 
the other approach is relevant to the interpretation of the relevant legal materials. 
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A welfarist court would think that when the law is ambiguous, it should interpret 
the law so as to maximize social welfare.
65 On this view, a vague constitutional provision 
such as the Eighth Amendment must be given some welfarist content. If the court 
believes that foreign courts and legislatures also care about maximizing welfare (though 
this need not be their exclusive concern), then the court can take foreign legal materials 
as evidence about what these foreign institutions believe are the rules that maximize 
welfare. Near-universal rejection of the juvenile death penalty provides evidence, on this 
view, that nearly every decisionmaker who has considered the question believes that the 
deterrent effect of the rule is small or nil, and that any deterrence benefits are outweighed 
by the costs (administrative, the welfare cost to the executed criminal and the criminal’s 
family, and so forth). 
A court could similarly believe that it should interpret ambiguous laws in a 
manner that respects rights, which qualify as such on the basis of a deontological account. 
Some theories of rights hold that rights are universal; if so, perhaps the same set of rights 
will be respected in most nations in which people can freely debate and openly.
66 Of 
course, distortions will occur; there can be no assurance that free debate will lead to the 
proper account of rights. But on the Condorcetian view, we might suppose that if most or 
all liberal democracies ban the juvenile death penalty, it is reasonable to infer that the 
death penalty would be rejected on the proper account of rights. (This may be the account 
that would be chosen by people behind the veil of ignorance, in Rawls’s terms,
67 or in an 
ideal speech situation, in Habermas’ terms.
68) Here, the frequency with which the penalty 
is rejected gives one confidence that the rejection is not based on local or particular moral 
intuitions but reflects universal moral convictions, and hence the right understanding of 
human rights.  
As long as the societies allow free debate, the very fact that very different 
societies come to the same conclusions increases one’s confidence that the norms are 
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genuinely universal and transcend merely historical or institutional differences.
69 Here is 
a way, noted above, that differences, rather than similarities, among societies strengthen 
the case for consulting foreign materials. Recall in this regard that agreement on 
outcomes, across disagreement or uncertainty about foundational questions, may itself 
fortify the argument for consulting the law of other states. If the overwhelming majority 
of states agree that there is a right to free speech, and also agree on a particular entailment 
of that right, we have some reason for confidence in their view, at least if it is supposed 
that all or most are at least 50% likely to be right. We have seen that the Universal 
Declaration of Rights can be understood in these terms, and so too for many international 
agreements about appropriate content of rights or about proper social practices.  
Consider, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a 
treaty that refines and establishes as law many of the civil and political rights in the 
Universal Declaration.
70 Many of the rights recognized by the ICCPR are ones that 
Americans take for granted, including prohibitions on slavery (Art. 8) arbitrary arrest 
(Art. 9), freedom of movement (Art. 12), and freedom of conscience (Art. 18). But for 
many countries emerging from authoritarian regimes in the 1980s and 1990s, the fact that 
this treaty existed, and reflected the judgments of numerous diverse countries, must have 
provided good reason for believing that the rights recognized in the treaty ought to be 
respected in their countries as well. Note that at least one country, Egypt, states in a 
declaration that the ICCPR was not inconsistent with the Sharia; the ratification of the 
ICCPR by other Muslim-dominated states might be similarly interpreted.
71 This suggests 
that, at some (relevant) level, people from different social and political systems may 
recognize that some norms transcend their differences – and that the very pervasiveness 
of a moral commitment is reason to accept it.  
By contrast, most states have refused to ratify the second optional protocol to the 
ICCPR, which bans the death penalty.
72 This refusal shows that judgments about the 
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effectiveness or desirability of the death penalty are more diverse, and that therefore a 
state deciding whether to eliminate the death penalty may learn relatively little from the 
judgments of other states.
73 
 
What’s relative?  
Morality may or may not be relative. But the right answer to a legal question with 
moral components will often vary from one state to another. Suppose, for example, that 
Georgia has no doctrine of “substantive due process,” whereas most states do have that 
doctrine. Georgia would not do well to borrow the practices of the states with such a 
doctrine. The reason is that any underlying moral judgment, relevant in states with a 
doctrine of substantive due process, is immaterial in Georgia. 
This last point is potentially general, in a way that raises difficulties for use of the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem to justify reference to the views of other states (understanding 
that word to include nations). Suppose that all states have constitutional provisions that 
provide some sort of guarantee of “equality under the law.” It is nonetheless possible that 
any particular state has a distinctive or even unique approach to that guarantee. We might 
imagine that the vast majority of states do not believe that bans on same-sex marriage 
violate the equal protection clause. But perhaps one state, or a few states, understand their 
equal protection clause in an unusually expansive way, and that this understanding fits 
with the state’s traditions. If so, the state (call it Massachusetts
74) legitimately rejects the 
judgments of other states. The broader point is that one does not have to be any kind of 
moral skeptic or relativist to think that insofar as they are properly translated into law, 
some moral norms are state-specific. In such cases, courts that are required to draw on the 
relevant local moral norms in order to interpret the law may be justified in ignoring 
conflicting norms in other states. This claim is a generalization of the suggestion that on 
some theories of constitutional interpretation, the practices of other states are usually 
irrelevant. 
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Legal and institutional differences 
Legal and institutional differences also matter. The stock example in the literature 
is Justice Breyer’s reliance on German law in making arguments about the meaning of 
American federalism.
75 German federalism allows the German states to enforce national 
law; so why not in America? The question may make sense if the practice of Germany is 
informative on some question of relevance to American law. The problem with the 
argument is that in Germany, the states play a far greater role in creating national law 
than American states do, and this institutional difference may well make German law 
uninformative on the questions that concern Americans.
76 
The point is, again, that differences matter when they are large and relevant, and 
not when they are small or irrelevant. Justice Breyer meant to suggest that the German 
practice helps to show what the American practice ought to be, or might legitimately or 
reasonably be; perhaps he erred in ignoring institutional differences between the two 
systems. Justice Breyer might therefore have been wrong to rely on German institutions. 
Note, however, that even under current practice it is quite common to appeal to British 
laws and institutions notwithstanding the fact that the British parliamentary system is 
more different from the American system than the various presidential systems in Latin 
America and elsewhere that are indeed modeled on the American system. Consider this 
remark of Justice Scalia: 
 
I don’t use British law for everything. I use British law for those elements of the 
Constitution that were taken from Britain. The phrase “the right to be confronted 
with witnesses against him” – what did confrontation consist of in England? It 
had a meaning to the American colonists, all of whom were intimately familiar 
with my friend Blackstone. And what they understood when they ratified this 
Constitution was that they were affirming the rights of Englishmen. So to know 
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what the Constitution meant at the time, you have to know what English law was 
at the time. And that isn’t so for every provision of the Constitution.
77 
 
On originalist grounds, Justice Scalia’s assumption that the criminal defendant’s 
confrontation right had the same understanding in the United States as in Britain is 
plausible, and his reliance on British law is therefore reasonable.
78 But note that the 
implicit assumption here is that eighteenth century Americans believed that the 
confrontation right should exist in America as it did in Britain, despite the enormous 
institutional differences between the two countries – Britain was a constitutional 
monarchy and America a quasi-democratic republic. One could imagine someone arguing 
in the eighteenth century (or today) that because the U.S. was a democratic country, it did 
not need to grant as generous protections to criminal defendants as Britain did, for 
politically motivated prosecutions would be punished at the polls (as they indeed were, in 
the election of 1800
79). If this argument is correct, the confrontation right in the U.S. 
should be understood more narrowly than the confrontation right in Britain. The contrary 
view, which prevailed, is that politically motivated or otherwise unfair prosecutions could 
be a serious problem in a democracy as well as in a monarchy.  
Thus, for some purposes large institutional differences do not matter. An obvious 
example involves the question whether the executive can use military force without a 
congressional declaration of war. On one view, the American Constitution should be 
understood with close reference to British practice, where the executive did not need 
legislative approval.
80 But on another view, the British practice is irrelevant, because a 
republic rests on different principles.
81 
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Consider again the juvenile death penalty. Is it relevant that it was abolished in 
countries with different political systems? One reason that it might be irrelevant is if we 
think that those political systems do not aggregate values and information well; but this 
seems highly unlikely, at least as a claim about the extremely wide range of systems that 
have abolished the death penalty. Another reason that it might be irrelevant is if we adopt 
a particular understanding of constitutional interpretation, in accordance with which the 
Eighth Amendment contains a fixed category of prohibitions, or a category of 
prohibitions that, if not fixed, evolves with changing values and practices in the United 
States alone. It is certainly possible to think that what counts as “cruel and unusual” is a 
function of the views of Americans, not of the world as a whole. If so, consultation of the 
practices of other nations is a blunder, because those practices do not bear on the proper 
interpretation of the American Constitution. We have seen that originalists so believe. 
82 
If correct, the same idea applies to many imaginable uses of comparative materials by 
federal courts; and so too, the same idea might be turned into an objection to 
consultation, by one state, of the practices of other states. 
The public policy question faced by the Texas court can be evaluated in a broadly 
similar way. Suppose that some foreign court also has a public policy exception to 
employment at will. Relevant considerations would include (1) whether the foreign 
employment market is relatively free or relatively constrained in other ways; (2) whether 
the foreign court is as capable as American courts in addressing these issues; and (3) 
whether the foreign country has other institutions for resolving employment disputes 
(such as pervasive unionization). For the Texas decision, however, it is unlikely that 
comparative practices would be deemed relevant, given the existing sources of law. The 
question is how informative those practices are on the particular question that concerns 
Texas. 
The upshot is that whether legal and institutional differences matter depends on 
context, and there is no reason to treat legal and institutional questions as different from 
factual and moral questions.  
 
The regression approach 
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One objection to the argument so far, which we call the regression problem, is not 
an objection to comparative constitutionalism per se, but to the method advocated by its 
supporters, which might seem excessively crude. If we want information, then the right 
way to obtain information is to perform regressions that control for differences among 
states, not to pick and choose among the states, and take those that seem similar in some 
ill-defined way, while ignoring those that seem different. To be sure, it would be 
exceedingly difficult for courts to perform regressions, a point to which we will return; 
for the moment we are trying to specify the right analysis and to bracket the question of 
whether judges can engage in it. 
Suppose that an American court wants to know whether the juvenile death penalty 
deters juvenile crime. A social scientist would answer this question by collecting data 
from different countries. The dependent variable would be, say, the juvenile crime rate. 
The main independent variable is whether a state has the juvenile death penalty or not. 
Other independent variables would attempt to control for factors that may affect the 
juvenile crime rate independently of the existence of the death penalty for juveniles: 
whether guns are available, whether the population is homogenous or ethnically mixed, 
whether there are great wealth differentials, whether the criminal justice system is 
effective or not, and so forth. These control variables would ensure (or try to ensure) that 
any relationship between the juvenile crime rate and the juvenile death penalty reflects 
the causal influence of the latter, and not some other factor that is partially correlated 
with the penalty. The court should perform the regression, and then conclude that the 
juvenile death penalty has deterrent effect if and only if the regression reveals such an 
effect.
83 
Regressions are not always possible, however. To see why, imagine that all states 
(except the U.S.) reject the juvenile death penalty. A regression will not reveal 
information about the deterrent effect of the juvenile death penalty because of lack of 
cross-state variation. Nonetheless, the rejection by all states of the juvenile death penalty 
may be informative: it may reveal that the government of each state believes that the 
juvenile death penalty is immoral, ineffectual, or otherwise unacceptable for its citizens. 
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  There are other ways to collect relevant information. One could conduct surveys 
asking people which punishment is more cruel; one could consult doctors and other 
experts. All of this might be useful information and in some settings courts should 
perhaps take advantage of it. But the benefit of relying on foreign law, rather than 
regression results based on foreign data, is that the law itself, in the right conditions, 
already embodies the regression results, in the sense that legislatures use their knowledge 
of local conditions in order to decide whether or not to implement the law. If American 
courts and experts have access to all the data in all countries, then the regression 
approach is the proper one. But if, as must be the usual case, American courts and experts 
do not have access to all data in all countries – because cultural differences and logistical 
problems make data collection and interpretation impossible – then foreign states’ laws 
and policies are the best evidence of what the underlying data say, and the Jury Theorem 
is properly applied. Comparative law, then, is a short cut that allows American courts to 
aggregate information through intermediaries such as national legislatures and courts. 
 
Are only liberal democracies relevant? 
  One might think that American courts should consult the legal materials only of 
liberal democracies. There may be reasons of administrative cost for limiting the field in 
this way, a point to which we will return.
84 And on Condorcetian grounds, democracies 
seem to deserve special attention, on the theory that on facts and morality, they are more 
than 50% likely to be right, as nondemocracies may not be. It may well be that 
democracies, because they are democratic, are more likely to incorporate information 
about what is true. Suppose, by contrast, that the relevant nations are dictatorships, 
inclined to oppress their people. Perhaps we will believe that the practices of 
dictatorships are less than 50% likely to be right. There may be an analogue at the 
domestic level; perhaps some states legitimately distrust most states on certain issues. But 
as a matter of principle, the argument for restricting consultation to liberal democracies 
seems vulnerable, at least in its crudest forms. 
  First, many countries that are not liberal democracies nonetheless have some good 
laws and institutions. There is no reason to think that a nondemocracy enacts only bad 
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laws; the leaders of most nondemocracies want the public to be satisfied as long as they 
can accomplish this goal without undermining their own ends. Indeed, much ordinary law 
– criminal law, contract law, and so forth – is relatively constant across both democracies 
and nondemocracies. For the purpose of comparative constitutionalism, relying on 
foreign legal materials is not meant to express approval of all aspects of the foreign 
country; it is simply a way of taking advantage of unexploited mines of information. 
  Second, the very fact that nondemocratic nations recognize a particular norm may 
show that the norm is exceptionally strong. For example, we are accustomed to think that 
nondemocracies are less tolerant of crime than democracies, and therefore have stricter 
criminal penalties. Thus, the fact that the vast majority of authoritarian states do not have 
the juvenile death penalty was frequently cited by its critics as powerful evidence that the 
penalty violates a significant norm – a norm so significant that even crime-obsessed 
authoritarian states cannot ignore it. 
  As a general matter, however, it is true that democracies are a more reliable 
source of information about facts and norms, simply because democratic governments are 
more tightly constrained by public opinions and values. Political competition gives 
parties an incentive to gauge popular attitudes, and itself generates information when 
elections reveal that a particular program is not as popular as one might have thought.
85 
But this is a matter of degree, and there is no reason in principle to doubt that successful 
authoritarian governments maintain power by catering to the interests of the public to 
some degree.
86 It follows that an ideal exercise in comparative constitutionalism would 
survey all countries, democracies and nondemocracies alike; place more weight on the 
legal materials of democracies than on those of nondemocracies; but not neglect the 
latter. However, it will often be more realistic to limit oneself to a small number of 
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countries, in which case one should focus on democracies, which probably do provide 
more reliable information. 
 
5. The Independence Condition and Cascades 
 
  The independence condition says that the decision of each state to adopt or reject 
a particular law must be independent (at least partially so) from the decisions of other 
states. As this condition is more complicated than the others, and as its violation can lead 
to some especially interesting results, we will go into more detail here. 
  The reason that independence is an important condition is that voters who have 
exactly the same information or views, or simply mimic other voters, do not, by agreeing 
on whether the outcome is good or bad, provide additional information about the sense or 
value of the outcome. Suppose, for example, that former colonies of the United Kingdom 
adopted certain British laws and institutions just because they were British, and not 
because the former colonies had made an independent judgment that those laws and 
institutions served their interests. We might imagine that some newly independent states 
adopted those laws and institutions because they did not have the time and resources to 
study the legal systems of other states, and so maintaining existing laws and institutions 
reduced transition costs.
87 In this case, the existence of identical British-derived legal 
rules in dozens of states provides no more information about the value of the rules than if 
they existed in only one state, Britain itself.  
  The violation of the independence condition can have an interesting effect known 
as a cascade. When cascades occur, there is far less reason to trust the judgments of many 
voters, or states, because the particular judgments of many or most do not add 
information. If one hundred voters say something, but ninety-seven are participants in a 
cascade, there is not much reason to trust their statement. Hence it is not the case that the 
probability of a correct judgment, by a large number of states, is high, simply because 
many of those states are not offering useful information.  
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There are two kinds of cascades: informational
88 and reputational.
89 Both kinds 
can occur across states as well as across individuals. To see how an informational 
cascade works, suppose that an urn contains seventy red chips and thirty black chips. One 
hundred people take turns taking a chip from the urn at random, examining it privately, 
and returning it to the urn. Each person must, in sequence, announce whether he thinks 
that the urn contains more red chips or more black chips. Everyone who guesses correctly 
receives a prize. The first person will rationally guess that the urn contains more red chips 
if the chip he selected is red, and that the urn contains more black chips if the chip he 
selected is black. The second person, in making his guess, will rationally take account 
both of the first person’s public guess and of the color of his own chip. For example, if 
the first person said “red,” the second person has reason to believe that the first chip was 
red. If the second person’s chip is also red, he will guess red; if it’s black he might guess 
red or black (at random). The third person will similarly take account of the public 
guesses of the first and second person as well as of the color of his own chip. 
  Four points should be made about this example. First, the majority of the group 
would almost certainly make the right guess if each person stated his own guess in 
isolation, unaffected by the judgments of those who came before. Second, people benefit 
each other by announcing their decision; in doing so, they disclose information about the 
number of red and black chips in the urn. Third, it is rational for everyone to take account 
of the public guess of prior speakers: one is more likely to guess correctly if one takes 
account of prior guesses than if one takes account only of the color of one’s own chip, as 
long as the prior guesses are honest statements about the color of the chip that was drawn. 
Fourth, people are less likely to guess right than they would if they were informed of the 
color of the chips chosen by those who preceded them as well as that person’s guess.  
This last point raises a serious problem. As more people guess, subsequent 
participants will place more weight on the prior guesses than on their own chip, and 
eventually people will simply repeat what was said before. A possible result is an 
informational cascade: The first three players might draw and therefore announce black, 
and then everyone will announce black, even though 70% of the actual draws are red.  
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It is easy to create erroneous cascades in the laboratory. The simplest experiment 
asked subjects to guess whether the experiment was using Urn A, which contained two 
red balls and one white, or Urn B, which contained two white balls and one red.
90 The 
point of the experiment is to see whether people will decide to ignore their own draw in 
the face of conflicting announcements by predecessors – and to explore whether such 
decisions will lead to cascades and errors. Cascades often developed and they often 
produced errors. Over 77% of “rounds” resulted in cascades, and 15% of private 
announcements did not reveal a “private signal,” that is, the information provided by 
people’s own draw. Here is an actual example of a cascade producing an entertainingly 




An informational cascade 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Private 
draw 
a a b b b b 
Decision  A A A A A A 
 
   There is a clear analogue at the level of states, both domestically and 
internationally. If two states have adopted a law, or if two state courts have made some 
innovation, a third may do so, not because of any kind of independent judgment, but 
because it is following its predecessors. And if three states have made the same decision, 
a cascade might be forming. The problem is that subsequent states might assume that 
decisions have been made independently, even though most have been following the 
crowd.
92 
    In a reputational cascade, people think that they know what is right, or what is 
likely to be right, but they nonetheless go along with the crowd in order to maintain the 
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good opinion of others. Suppose that Albert suggests that global warming is a serious 
problem, and that Barbara concurs with Albert, not because she actually thinks that 
Albert is right, but because she does not wish to seem, to Albert, to be ignorant or 
indifferent to environmental protection. If Albert and Barbara seem to agree that global 
warming is a serious problem, Cynthia might not contradict them publicly and might 
even appear to share their judgment, not because she believes that judgment to be correct, 
but because she does not want to face their hostility or lose their good opinion. It should 
be easy to see how this process might generate a cascade. Once Albert, Barbara, and 
Cynthia offer a united front on the issue, their friend David might be reluctant to 
contradict them even if he thinks that they are wrong. The apparent views of Albert, 
Barbara, and Cynthia carry information; that apparent view might be right. But even if 
David thinks that they are wrong and has information supporting that conclusion, he 
might not want to take them on publicly. The problem, of course, is that the group will 
not hear what David knows.  
  The same problem emerges at the level of states. Some states follow others, not 
because of private information, but because of reputational pressures. Suppose, for 
example, that a number of states have adopted some version of Megan’s Law – a statute 
requiring registration of sex offenders.
93 Additional states might follow the first group, 
not because they believe the statute is a good idea, but because its supporters are able to 
impose reputational pressure by virtue of the practice of prior states. When this is so, the 
decisions of those in a cascade fail to provide additional information. 
  The cascade model provides an important warning about using the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem to justify reliance on the view of a majority of states. Suppose that the law of all 
states is identical, all states chose their law as an act of judgment (condition 1), and all 
states are similar along the relevant dimensions (condition 2). Nonetheless, the fact that 
all states have the same law is no more informative than if only one or two states had the 
same law if it turns out that later states imitated earlier states – as they should, under our 
analysis! In this sense, use of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, to justify reference to the law 
of other states, turns out to be self-defeating; it undermines its own precondition. 
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  This odd implication should not, however, be taken too seriously. It would be true 
only if a relevant number of states did in fact merely imitate and fail to make independent 
judgments. They might sometimes, especially in the important but narrow case where 
new states adopt or inherit wholesale foreign legal systems, which is known as legal 
transplant.
94 In this case, and possible other cases where the evidence suggests that a law 
was adopted out of imitation and not as a result (at least partially) of independent 
judgment, an American court should discount the law of another state. But in the usual 
case, states imitate laws and policies of other states only after going through a process of 
deliberation, one that takes account of local conditions and difference between the earlier 
adopters and the state in question. In this case, the “vote” is only partially dependent, and 
thus reveals some information about the general desirability of the laws and policies at 
issue. 
  A further implication is that a state that ignores the decisions of the other states 
and instead makes a decision based on its own “draw” confers a positive externality on 
other states by revealing information – information that later decisionmakers would 
benefit from. The private incentive is to herd, but the public-spirited thing to do is to 
decide on the basis of one’s own information, at least in many circumstances. Thus, the 
cosmopolitan – the person who believes that national boundaries are morally arbitrary 
and that people owe moral obligations to foreigners to the same extent as to fellow 
citizens
95 – ought to prefer states not to imitate other states, or at least, not to imitate 
other states as often as a state would if it consulted only its private interest. 
  This last point bears emphasis. If our conditions are met, it is rational for a state to 
imitate other states but it may not be in the global interest for the state to imitate other 
states. If our conditions are not met, it is neither privately rational nor globally desirable 
for a state to imitate other states. 
  To complicate our analogy, we might distinguish between a state’s public 
decision (the “guess”) and the reasons (if any) that it gives for its decision. In our urn 
example, a public-spirited person would both announce the color of his chip and make his 
guess (which would be partially based on the guesses, and hence the chip colors, of the 
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prior decisionmakers). Subsequent decisionmakers would ignore the guess and pay 
attention only to the announcement of the chip color. This would lead to the optimal 
result.  
Similarly, public-spirited states ought to make their decision and announce the 
reasons for their decision. For example, a state might announce that it abolishes the 
juvenile death penalty because citizens do not believe that it deters crime, because 
citizens think it is wrong to execute people for crimes they committed as juveniles, or 
because it cannot join the EU unless it abolishes the juvenile death penalty. Another state 
might rationally take account of the first state’s decision only in the first case, and not in 
the second or third. But all this depends on states giving a candid explanation for their 
decision; we suspect that in many cases there is either no official explanation, there is 
disagreement about what the explanation is, or (in the case of authoritarian states) the true 
explanation and the official explanation are different. Note that in some cases a state 
might delegate to academics or foreign service agents or others the duty to find out what 
the real explanation is. For example, one could commission a statistical study to see 
whether abolishing the juvenile death penalty has an effect on crime across countries. 
This returns us to our earlier point that empirical studies might be helpful but they must 
be more carefully done than those that have appeared so far in the opinions of the 
Supreme Court. 
 
6. Foreign Law Versus International Law 
 
  In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court justified its abandonment of Bowers v. Hardwick 
partly by reference to international materials: 
 
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should 
be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. 
The European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own 
decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.
96 
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Bowers had upheld a law criminalizing homosexual sodomy; Lawrence found that a 
similar law violated the due process clause. In citing the ECHR, Lawrence did not cite 
“foreign law,” in the sense of a decision of a foreign national court interpreting a foreign 
statute or constitution; it cited international law, in the sense of an international court 
interpreting an international treaty. 
  International law is different from foreign law. International law is the law that 
states create to govern their relations with each other. Foreign law, as used in the 
literature, is the domestic law of foreign states. The literature has so far not made much of 
these differences; where it has, most authors have treated international law as deserving 
of the same consultation that foreign national law deserves.
97 However, the differences 
between foreign law and international law are important, and the case for relying on 
international law is trickier than the case for relying on foreign law. 
  One puzzling question is whether the European Court’s application of a regional 
convention ought to receive more or less weight than a national court’s application of a 
national constitution. Should the ECHR’s application of the European Convention on 
Human Rights to a particular set of fact receive more weight than the application of, say, 
the German high court of German law or of European law? Several factors are relevant. 
First, the European Court has jurisdiction over 45 states, not just one; these 45 states have 
agreed on the underlying convention and on the authority of the court to interpret it; and 
therefore, the Court’s outcome may reflect the aggregate wisdom of a very large 
population rather than a relatively small one. If this is so, there is a Condorcetian reason 
to give special weight to the views of the European Court. However, there is no reason to 
count the treaty – or the decision of an international court charged with interpreting the 
treaty – as an extra Condorcet vote beyond the votes of the 45 states. On the most 
optimistic account, the treaty and the decision simply reflect the aggregate judgment of 
the 45 states. 
Second, one might worry that a treaty is less likely to reflect the independent 
judgments of the states than national law does. Many parties to the convention became 
parties in order to obtain the benefits of cooperation with other European countries. These 
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states may have entered the ECHR system despite their doubts about particular rules or 
norms rather than because of them.
98 If so, the European Court’s judgment may be worth 
less, or not much more, than the judgment of a national court interpreting national law.
99 
Third, the ECHR’s judgment might be considered less valuable than that of a 
clear treaty because the ECHR may not have the private information that the separate 
governments have. Suppose, for example, that the ECHR’s decision was based on the 
views of the ECHR’s judges about whether laws against sodomy are likely to discourage 
unsafe sexual practices that spread disease, not on clear treaty language. One might worry 
that these judges’ views of the facts reflect less private information about this question 
than the aggregate information contained in the judgments of 45 courts in 45 countries, 
deciding independently. Something similar might be said if the decision of the ECHR 
reflects judgments of morality rather than judgments of fact. 
  Taken together, these factors suggest that a domestic court should not place any 
weight on international treaties, except as the equivalent of a “vote” by each of the 
parties. The European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the European 
court, indicates that 45 states reject criminalizing sodomy, and nothing beyond that; or it 
might simply reflect one court’s views about the risks associated with sodomy. Further, 
because of the ambiguities surrounding the states’ motives for entering the treaty, one 
might want to count the ECHR decision as something less than 45 votes. 
  Another set of issues is raised by treaties that the United States has ratified. 
Imagine that the U.S. government enacts a statute permitting American agents to torture 
suspects in the war on terror, and a constitutional challenge has been mounted. The U.S. 
court must decide whether torture violates the doctrine of substantive due process.
100 In 
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doing so, it might consult foreign materials on Condorcetian grounds – including foreign 
legislation and judicial decisions regarding torture. But should it consult the Convention 
Against Torture, which the United States ratified?
101 The Convention might be a useful 
shortcut for determining foreign law, at least if one believes that foreign states ratified the 
Convention because they believed that torture is never justified and that foreign states act 
consistently with the Convention. A court with limited resources might do better by 
consulting the Convention than by consulting the law and practices of each party to the 
Convention, as long as it recognizes that practices may diverge. But should the 
Convention count for more than evidence that its parties oppose torture?  
Our comments above suggest not: at best, the Convention aggregates the 
information of its parties. As for the American “vote,” the new statute permitting torture 
simply reflects a new judgment by legislators about the appropriateness of torture, so the 
Convention does not provide any information about American attitudes or facts, except as 
they existed in the past. Thus, there does not seem to be any reason for an American court 
adjudicating a hypothetical torture statute to attach any weight to the Convention beyond 
using it as a proxy for the laws of its other parties. 
  These observations apply with even greater force when the United States enters 
human rights treaties subject to reservations that ensure that the treaties do not infringe on 
domestic constitutional restrictions and, in some cases, do not modify existing domestic 
law. Thus, a particular term in a treaty that the U.S. has ratified may not reflect American 
policy. The claim that such treaties should nonetheless inform American law – a claim 
made so far by commentators, not by judges
102 – cannot rest on a straightforward 
application of the Jury Theorem, given that American legislators are just as able to rely 
on the Theorem as judges are, and presumably have good reasons for rejecting the views 
of other countries. 
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  A further point, which has been made by Michael Ramsey,
103 is that many 
international institutions that have been cited as authorities do not necessarily have 
independent information about international practices, and in some instances may not 
have good incentives to report them honestly. An EU brief in the Atkins case, for 
example, cited a statement of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights as 
support for the statement that application of the death penalty to mentally disabled people 
violate international norms.
104 The problem with relying on the UN Commission on 
Human Rights is not just that many of its members are countries that engage in abusive 
human rights practices: after all, maybe this just shows that applying the death penalty to 
mentally disabled people is even worse than other human rights abuses. The real 
problem, from the perspective of the Jury Theorem, is that the UN Commission does not 
have any information that is unavailable to anyone else, and that its collective judgment 
does not reflect wisdom that exceeds what can be gleaned from independent examination 
of the national laws and decisions of the states who are its members. 
  In sum, international treaties and the decisions of international courts are best 
treated as proxies for the “votes” of the states that are parties to the treaties; beyond this, 
they have no independent weight for the Condorcetian judge. If fifty states have ratified a 
treaty that prohibits a particular action, and the states appear to comply with their treaty 
obligations, then, in the best case, the treaty (or the decision based on it) should be 
counted as fifty votes. The treaty itself should not have influence beyond this function as 
a proxy: it should not be treated as an extra vote or, otherwise, as a special source of 
information. When evidence suggests that some states entered into the treaty for ulterior 
motives, or refuse to obey it, then the treaty’s value as a proxy should accordingly be 
discounted. And when international commissions render decisions that are not based on 
private information about facts (moral or non-moral), these decisions should not be 
entitled to any weight. 
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7. Judicial Competence and a Framework 
 
  We now turn to a large question that we have bracketed throughout. How, if at all, 
can courts (or other institutions, such as legislatures and administrative agencies) 
undertake the relevant inquiries? 
 
Issues of administrability 
The Jury Theorem implicitly assumes that the person who implements the policy 
chosen by the jury will adequately interpret the jurors’ votes. In the actual jury setting, 
this assumption is harmless: jurors clearly vote “guilty” or “not guilty” and the judge can 
accordingly order the internment or release of the defendant. In the setting of comparative 
constitutionalism, the assumption becomes more problematic. Can judges reliably 
interpret foreign materials, so that they can tell whether a particular law or decision 
should be considered a “vote” in favor of some moral norm, empirical fact, or policy?
105 
More generally, can they assess the three relevant conditions?  
Our analysis so far might seem to suggest that the proper use of foreign materials 
requires such exhaustive information about foreign norms and institutions that judges 
could not possibly use foreign materials properly. Here, we think, is the strongest 
argument against the use of comparative materials, to the effect that the best inquiry is so 
complex, so unlikely to be helpful, and so likely to produce error, that it should not be 
undertaken at all. Note as well that an emphasis on the question of competence might, as 
a first approximation, support the use of “comparative law” in the domestic context, by 
suggesting that the relevant inquiries will generally argue that one state should pay 
attention to the views of other states – while also suggesting that the same inquiries 
counsel against attention, by the United States Supreme Court, to the views of other high 
courts. On this view, an intuitive but plausible understanding of decision costs and error 
costs justifies use of comparative law in the domestic setting, but not internationally. 
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Perhaps state courts much benefit from the use of decisions by other state courts, because 
they learn a great deal without running into intractable problems of assessing the relevant 
conditions. Perhaps the opposite conclusion holds for national courts deciding whether to 
consult materials of other nations. If so, an interesting mystery would remain, which is 
why so many courts, interpreting their own constitutions, do refer to the practices of other 
nations.
106 
  Suppose, however, that comparative constitutionalism may be challenged because 
of problems of judicial competence.
107 When judges are required to make difficult 
decisions based on complex facts, the usual response is not to direct them to ignore the 
facts. On the contrary, the standard alternative to provide a doctrinal framework – a set of 
rules – that simplifies the factual analysis. These rules typically direct judges to ignore 
facts that are unlikely to be relevant, or to rely on presumptions that reflect what is 
generally accepted. The standard tradeoff is between bright-line rules and standards: the 
more that the law embodies a rule, the lower the decision costs and the greater the error 
costs. When decision costs are high, errors are tolerable, and rules should be used. In 
extreme cases, the decision and error costs may be so high that the optimal rule would 
simply forbid courts to take account of the relevant facts; but such a conclusion is 
premature for comparative constitutionalism,
108 as standard practices throughout the 
world tend to suggest. 
 
Principles 
  To discipline the inquiry, consider a few possibilities. These are designed for any 
English-speaking high court, but they could easily be adapted by courts of many different 
kinds. 
•  The Condorcet Jury Theorem teaches that the informational value of an 
additional vote declines rapidly after a certain number of votes have been 
registered. In other words, surveying 10 countries is much more important 
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than surveying 5; but surveying 190 countries adds little beyond a survey of 
185. Perhaps, then, judges should survey the legal materials of 10 or 20 other 
(relevant) countries, and not try to survey the legal materials of all 190 or so 
countries. This will allow them to spend more time avoiding errors, and will 
reduce the aggregate information by very little. As we have suggested, a point 
of this sort strengthens the idea that the United States Supreme Court should 
restrict itself to the practices of other democracies. 
•  As we noted, the value of using foreign legal materials depends on their being 
an accurate gauge of the sentiments and judgments of the population. This 
point suggests that judges should not survey the legal materials of foreign 
nations that have highly authoritarian or dysfunctional institutions. We suspect 
that there is, for similar reasons, little reason to consult the legal materials of 
nations with small populations, which are the overwhelming majority. 
•  Judges should consult nations whose legal materials are translated into 
English and adequately understood in the English-speaking world. 
•  Judges should favor recent sources over old sources, because the recent 
sources are more likely to reflect modern conditions. 
•  Judges should be alert to cascades, which are most likely when uniform legal 
change occurs rapidly without much debate or deliberation across different 
countries. 
  Taken together, these principles suggest that English-speaking courts should 
probably confine themselves to only about twenty or thirty countries, including the 
western liberal democracies, plus countries like India, Japan, Brazil, Israel, and South 
Korea. The precise set of countries might appropriately be constant across cases (a bright-
line rule), or it might be better to have the set depend on the type of case. In any event, 
we think that if courts are to take comparative constitutionalism seriously, they should be 
required to go through each of the countries in the relevant set and describe explicitly in 
the opinion whether the outcomes in those countries are consistent and support the 
constitutional interpretation advanced by the court. It may be that this level of care is 
unnecessary in most cases. But when the Supreme Court of Ireland, the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, or the Supreme Court of Australia is consulting foreign practices, 43 
 
principles of these kinds should help to discipline and systematize the inquiry. In most 
cases, the analysis should be relatively straightforward. Where foreign law is most useful, 
it is because there is a consensus or strong majority on one or another side, and it is 
usually simple to establish that fact. State courts often examine the practices of other 
states in search of a clear majority position, and the same can easily be done, most of the 
time, at the international level. 
  Because the legitimate sources of American constitutional law are sharply 
disputed, some people will reject the claim that a framework of this sort should be used in 
the United States.
109 But some of these principles exist, in nascent form, in the U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions that rely on foreign legal materials. Although Atkins too casually 
claimed that the “world community” rejected capital punishment of the mentally 
retarded,
110 and Roper also referred to the rejection of the juvenile death penalty by 
nearly the entire world,
111 Lawrence limited itself to western Europe
112 and so did other 
earlier cases.
113 The problem is that none of the relevant decisions provided anything like 
a systematic account of the relevant laws, and for this reason they can be legitimately 
criticized. If such an account would be too difficult, then courts should limit themselves 
to a few countries, so that one can be confident of their assessment of the laws, rather 
than surveying the entire world.
114  
  The general point is that the imperfection of judges does not imply that judges 
should refuse to consult foreign law on the ground that they are incompetent to do so. 
Intermediate bright-line rules can guide them so that they rely on the right sort of facts 
and not the wrong sort of facts. Although in principle the optimal decision rule might 
forbid judges to engage in comparative constitutionalism because of the empirical 
difficulties,
115 this conclusion seems speculative and premature. As we have suggested, 
the very fact that the high courts of so many nations engage in this practice counts against 
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the speculation. It may be too much to contend that the pervasiveness of the practice 
suggests a Condorcetian argument in favor of a Condorcetian procedure. But at the very 
least, the fact that the practice is common raises a cautionary note about those who would 
confidently dismiss it. 
 
A framework 
  Drawing the stands of the analysis together, we propose the following 
formulation, designed both for state courts within the United States and for high courts 
consulting the practices of other nations. Courts should use foreign law to interpret 
constitutional provisions when the proper interpretation requires factual or moral 
information, and that factual and moral information is likely to be reflected in foreign 
legal materials. Foreign legal materials are likely to be useful in this way when (1) the 
foreign legal materials are relatively uniform; (2) the foreign legal materials are the result 
of legislative or judicial judgments in the foreign states; (3) the problems addressed by 
those materials are relatively similar; and (4) the foreign legal materials reflect relatively 
independent judgments. 
Within the United States, the standard practice of consulting the law of other 
states reflects this idea. In private law, the practice of determining the law in a particular 
state by reference to the “majority rule” is so common as to be virtually invisible; this is 
also usually what state courts do when they rely on restatements. It is well known but 
nonetheless worth emphasizing that when state courts rely on cases from other 
jurisdictions, they are relying on “foreign law,” unlike, say, a federal court that relies on a 
federal decision in another state or circuit. The implicit rationale for state law 
comparativism is that the state courts understand themselves to be addressing similar 
problems despite cultural, historical, institutional, and demographic differences across 
states. The Condorcet Jury Theorem helps to explain the general practice 
With respect to non-American cases, the American court should first discard the 
legal materials of the foreign states that do not meet conditions (2), (3), and (4); and then 
should determine whether the remaining legal materials are uniform, and occur in a 
nontrivial number of states (say, 5 or more). Some useful proxies may further narrow 
discretion. An American court might simplify its task by considering only relatively 45 
 
recent laws and decisions (under point 2), by considering the laws of only states that have 
similar problems along the relevant dimension (under point 3), and by considering only 
laws that appear to be the result of substantial legislative process or litigation (under point 
4).  
This framework might work better for some cases than others. If the applicable 
theory of interpretation makes international practice irrelevant, the argument for 
consulting international practice is over before it begins. In addition, much depends on 
whether judges are capable of evaluating whether these conditions are satisfied. But in 




Our analysis of judicial decisionmaking might easily be generalized; it has broad 
applications to other types of decisionmaking. Nonjudicial officials – including 
presidents, decisionmakers in regulatory agencies, and legislators – also can benefit from 
looking at the laws and institutions of other states. Indeed, this practice is so common and 
entrenched as to be almost invisible. Leaders of newly independent states after World 
War II, and states emerging from communism after the cold war, made basic choices 
about market and democratic institutions after observing the experiences of successful 
states. American state legislatures frequently imitate the lawmaking of legislatures in 
other states. Megan’s Law and Three Strikes Laws are among the most well known of 
countless examples.
117  
Foreign governments have frequently imitated the U.S. as well as each other – 
consider the deregulation and privatization movement over the last several decades, and 
the more recent influence of cost-benefit analysis and tradable permit programs.
118 And 
the American government has occasionally imitated other states as well. In all of these 
cases, the decisionmakers considered the experiences in other states because these 
experiences provided valuable information about the likely effects of the law or program 
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in question. Not all of these cases were successes; some states learned more from other 
foreign institutions than other states did.
119 The process of learning, we suggest, is 
appropriately disciplined by a framework of the general sort proposed here. 
 
7. Some Empirical Implications 
 
  Our argument has had a normative orientation, but it also has some testable 
empirical implications. It is plausible to suppose that state courts and foreign national 
courts implicitly rely on Condorcetian logic when consulting the decisions of other states 
or nation states. The arithmetic may not be familiar, but it is intuitive to think that if a 
large number of states have chosen to do X, there is reason to believe that X is right. If 
Condorcetian logic is indeed at work, we can derive two noteworthy hypotheses. 
 
The young state hypothesis 
Some states are younger than others in a political sense. Alaska and Hawaii are 
younger than Massachusetts. Israel is younger than the United States. Many nation-states 
are old but have recently undergone a revolution or acquired radically new (for them) 
institutions – South Africa, Hungary, China, the Czech Republic, Poland, and others. 
These nation-states are “young” in our sense. We hypothesize that young states are more 
likely to rely on foreign law than old states are. The reason is that young states have more 
to learn, and old states have more entrenched practices that are harder to change. 
  Anecdotal evidence on behalf of this hypothesis is the frequently noted fact that 
American courts relied heavily on the law of Britain in the early years of the republic, but 
rarely consult foreign law today.
120 In addition, the frequently cited examples of 
consultations mostly come from young states such as Israel,
121 South Africa,
122 and 
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Hungary. It would be useful to test this hypothesis on American state courts. Do Alaskan 
courts consult the law of other states more than Massachusetts court do, controlling for 
population and legal activity? If so, this would support the Condorcetian hypothesis. 
In fact, we can find more systematic support for that hypothesis from the evident 
fact that within American courts, citations to sister states have been decreasing over time. 
In Montana, for example, 50% of citations were to out-of-state courts in 1914-1915, 39% 
in 1954-1955, and merely 7% in 1994.
123 A similar decline has been found in 
California.
124 In Minnesota, out-of-state citations were common in the early years, but 
have diminished over time with the development of in-state constitutional precedent;
125 
this is precisely the pattern we would predict on Condorcetian grounds. A broader study, 
involving 16 state supreme courts from 1870 to 1970, shows a significant decline in 
citations to out-of-state law.
126 As states built up their own jurisprudence, there is a 
reduced need to rely on sister states for relevant information. Note in this regard the 
straightforward prediction for South Africa: “As the Court gains experience and 
precedents take root, the Court’s need to canvass international and foreign comparative 
jurisprudence for insights and guidance may diminish.”
127 
 
The good state hypothesis 
Some states are “better” than others. The population is healthier, freer, happier, 
and wealthier. It is reasonable to think that better states have better institutions,
128 and 
therefore that states that seek to improve the well being of their citizens will copy the 
institutions of the more successful states. As we noted above, during the Meiji restoration 
the Japanese establishment carefully and self-consciously surveyed foreign institutions 
and tried to establish domestic versions of those that they thought were superior. 
Similarly, courts might believe that they should consult the foreign materials of “good” 
states while ignoring those of bad states. The reason follows from the logic of the Jury 
Theorem: States should consult comparative materials because of the information they 
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convey, and the practices of some states are more likely to convey relevant information 
than the practices of others. The “votes” of good states are more likely to be correct than 
the votes of bad states; thus, a court facing resource constraints and unable to survey the 
legal materials of all states, should focus on the better states. 
  Evidence in support of this hypothesis is that foreign courts typically consult the 
legal materials of the western liberal democracies, and not of failed states such as the 
Soviet Union or authoritarian states such as China and Cuba.
129 Domestically, the data 
also provide some support for the hypothesis. From 1870 to 1970 state supreme courts 
cited the opinions of the New York, Massachusetts, and California courts much more 
frequently than the opinions of other courts; other frequently cites courts include those of 
Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, and Minnesota.
130 All of these states are among the 
wealthier states in the country. It is also worth noting that the citation dominance of New 
York, Massachusetts, and California has declined since the nineteenth century.
131 This 
trend could reflect their loss of relative position as the south reemerged and wealth and 
population spread through the country, and other states built up their own jurisprudences. 
  The argument for focusing on good states is that resource constraints may prevent 
courts from relying on all states, as Condorcetian principles require. As long as bad states 
are likely to be right with a probability greater than one half, their legal materials are a 
valuable source of information.
132 However, American jurisprudence has discovered a 
useful device for aggregating the information of all states in such a way that judges can 
benefit from this information without doing their own surveys, case by case. This device 
is the restatement. Restatements reflect the aggregated wisdom – the majority rule – of all 
states, and hence show an implicit Condorcetian logic as well.
133 Before the restatement 
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project began in the 1920s, one would have expected a heavy citation bias in favor of the 
good states; as the restatements were published, the bias should have declined as states 
increasingly relied on the restatements. As noted above, the dominance of the good states 
has declined over time; however, we do not have evidence about restatement citations. 
We hypothesize that restatement citations displaced citations to good states; this 
hypothesis is of course testable. 
 
Competing Theories 
  Both of the principal hypotheses discussed so far should be compared to those 
that might be derived from other theories of comparative constitutionalism. We will 
briefly consider two such theories: the theory that courts consult foreign law not for 
information but because they seek, as much as possible, to harmonize domestic and 
foreign law – in order to ease crossborder transactions
134 – and the theory that courts 
choose among foreign legal materials partly on the basis of political or symbolic 
agendas.
135 A third theory, the rationalization theory, which holds that courts cite foreign 
law in order to rationalize decisions based on personal preferences,
136 does not have any 
testable implications, as far as we can tell, and so we will not address it. Although the 
theory follows from the attitudinal model advanced by many political scientists, for 
which there is some evidence,
137 no one has explained why judges who decide according 
to personal preferences would cite foreign materials in some opinions and not others, and 
why some judges who decide according to personal preferences cite foreign materials and 
other judges who decide according to personal preferences do not. 
The harmonization hypothesis reflects a common belief about the behavior of 
state courts in the United States. This theory does not imply as strongly as the 
Condorcetian theory does that state courts would more frequently consult legal materials 
from older or wealthier states. Instead, it implies that state courts would use foreign legal 
                                                                                                                                                 
Property Exemption Laws, 47 J. Law & Econ. 19, 28 (2004). If state legislators decided better than 
randomly, the federal approach follows the Condorcetian logic. 
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materials even when there is no possibility of obtaining information from them. Some 
evidence supports the harmonization hypothesis: state courts more frequently cite courts 
from the states in the same region.
138 If, as seems likely, most crossborder transactions 
occur across neighboring states, the regional bias in citation practices supports the 
harmonization thesis. However, if regional proximity also indicates similarity, the 
evidence also supports the Condorcetian view. Interestingly, a stronger empirical effect is 
that state courts cite courts from states from which they have drawn migrants.
139 If most 
crossborder transactions are between states connected by migration, this evidence 
supports the harmonization thesis. However, there is no reason to believe that 
transactions are correlated with migration. More likely, the bias in favor of states that 
send migrants reflects the similarity condition of the Condorcet theory, namely, that 
similar states provide more relevant “votes” than different states, where culture is an 
important aspect of similarity. 
The global version of the harmonization thesis implies that national courts will 
cite national courts from nation states with which the home state has significant trade 
relationships, at least for areas of law touching on transactions. The major trading 
partners of the United States include Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and the 
United Kingdom.
140 The U.S. Supreme Court does not seem inclined to cite China’s, 
Japan’s, or Mexico’s decisions. Canada’s largest trading partner is the United States, yet 
the Canadian Supreme Court avoids citing the U.S. Supreme Court.
141 Although firm 
conclusions should await a formal test – one that determines whether correlations exist 
between citation and trade or other crossborder transactions, holding relevant variables 
constant – the anecdotal evidence we have cited suggests that the harmonization thesis is 
an unpromising account of foreign citation practices. 
The geopolitics theory suggests that geopolitics explain the pattern of citation. 
Frederick Schauer argues that courts might cite the legal materials of nation states that are 
                                                 
138 See Harris, supra. 
139 Id. 
140 United States Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. International 
Trade and Freight Transportation Trends tble. 3 (2003), available at: 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/us_international_trade_and_freight_transportation_trends/2003/html/table
_03.html. 
141 See Schauer, supra, at 260. 51 
 
allies and avoid citing the materials of rivals or historic enemies.
142 He observes, for 
example, that the Canadian Supreme Court avoids citing the U.S. Supreme Court, which, 
on his view, might be a product of Canadian sensitivity about being perceived as a fifty-
first state. He also observes that the Irish Supreme Court avoids citing British law, and 
argues that this may reflect the historic enmity between these two countries. We could 
extend this argument. The Israeli Supreme Court does not much cite the law of the Arab 
states, and vice versa, and we suspect that the India Supreme Court does not cite the 
decisions of Pakistani courts. 
However, Schauer’s argument that that citation practices reflect geopolitical 
rivalries and alliances seems doubtful on other grounds. If Schauer’s argument is not just 
a reformation of the Good State hypothesis, it must mean that courts avoid citing the law 
of good states in order to make a symbolic point or play to public opinion. Consider his 
claim that Canada’s high court is frequently cited by foreign courts because Canada is 
esteemed as a wealthy and secure country that is not the United States. Although we have 
not found poll data on world attitudes toward Canada,
143 we have found data about 
popular attitudes around the world to other states or (in the case of Europe) regional 
entities. A poll of the attitudes of people in 33 countries found that the state/entity 
regarded most favorably was Europe, followed by Japan, France, Great Britain, India, 
China, Russia, and the United States.
144 Yet, as far as the evidence suggests, citations to 
the courts of Japan, India, China, and Russia are uncommon.
145 
A further problem with the geopolitics theory is that it does not fit, or imply 
anything special for, the behavior of the courts of American states. Perhaps we might 
predict that states in the former confederacy were less likely to cite northern states after 
the civil war than each other, and vice versa, and perhaps we would expect that this effect 
would fade with time, as mutual hostility diminished. This prediction is testable. 
Otherwise, American states are not allies or rivals in the geopolitical sense, and it is hard 
to think of a domestic analogy to Schauer’s argument. 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 Canada is not independently assessed in recent studies of world opinion. See, e.g., 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/168.php?nid=&id=&pnt=168&lb=hmpg1 
144Global Poll Finds Iran Viewed Negatively,  http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa 
/articles/home_page/168.php?nid=&id=&pnt=168&lb=hmpg1 
145 See notes supra, none of which finds significant citations to the courts of these nations.  52 
 
In sum, many testable hypotheses emerge from the Condorcetian theory and its 
rivals. Existing studies and anecdotal evidence provide some suggestive support for the 
Condorcetian view. We suspect that courts are implicit Condorcetians, and we have 





One of our principal claims here is that the debate over consideration of foreign 
law by the United States Supreme Court should be seen not in isolation, but instead in the 
context of the frequent consultation, by state and national courts alike, of law that is 
“foreign” in the sense that it does not emanate from the particular sovereign whose law is 
being interpreted. We have suggested that the pervasiveness of this practice is best 
understood by reference to the Condorcet Jury Theorem: If many courts have decided on 
a particular course of action, and if each of them is likely to make choices that are better 
than random, there is excellent reason to believe that this course of action is right. 
But this judgment holds only if three conditions have been met. First, the courts in 
question must be making judgments based on private information. Second, those courts 
must be relevantly similar to the jurisdiction that is consulting them. Third, the court must 
have made their judgments independently, and must not be participating in a cascade. An 
understanding of these conditions helps to explain the fact that in the United States, it is 
so much less controversial for state courts to consult other state courts than for the 
Supreme Court to consult other high courts. Most important, the similarity condition is 
frequently met in the domestic case, whereas it is less clear that other nations are 
relevantly similar to the United States for purposes of interpreting disputed constitutional 
provisions. Perhaps the meaning of the United States Constitution does not turn on 
factual or moral issues with respect to which international consensus is relevant. Perhaps 
the meaning of other national constitutions does turn, in part, on the existence of such a 
consensus. 
We have not attempted to resolve such questions here; our analysis is agnostic on 
the proper sources of constitutional interpretation. But whenever a national court is 53 
 
concerned with establishing what is right, on facts or on morality, such a consensus is 
legitimately brought to bear. The same point applies to other public and even private 
institutions. For this reason, our analysis of the Jury Theorem, and of the three conditions 
that bear on its pertinence, has implications not only for judicial practices, but for 
legislative and administrative behavior as well. And while our principal argument is 
normative, we suggest, more tentatively, that an intuitive appreciation of the Jury 
Theorem helps to explain both domestic and international behavior, much of which 
seems to reflect an implicit Condorcetian logic.  